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THE FCC's TELEVISION DUOPOLY RULE:
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I. INTRODUCTION
Almost since its inception, the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC" or "Commission") has employed its broad authority under the pub-
lic interest standard of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,' to
impose limits on the ownership of broadcast stations.2 Always controver-
sial, Commission broadcast ownership policies have come under Supreme
Court review on three occasions3 and led to congressional intervention on
many others.4
The debate about whether and to what extent the public interest requires
or permits these limits in today's video marketplace has now resurfaced. In
* Cf. Covad Communications Co. v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (uphold-
ing FCC unbundling rules under 47 U.S.C. § 251, and concluding that "the Commission's
fourth try is a charm").
1 J.D., 1976, University of Virginia School of Law; A.B., 1973, Princeton University.
Mr. Richardson is a partner with the law firm of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr
LLP, whose clients include television stations with an interest in the proceedings described
herein.
1 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 307, 309 (2000).
2 See, e.g., In re Genesee Radio Corp., Flint, Mich. Application For Construction Per-
mit, Statement of Facts, Grounds for Decision, and Order, 5 F.C.C. 183, 186-87 (Mar. 2,
1938). See generally Herbert H. Howard, Multiple Broadcast Ownership: Regulatory His-
tory, 27 FED. CoMM. B.J. 1, 3-4 (1974).
See Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (limiting network owner-
ship of stations in the same area); United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956)
(limiting to seven the number of AM, FM, and television stations that could be owned na-
tionwide); FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (noting the prohi-
bition on newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership).
4 See, e.g., Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 98-396, § 304, 98
Stat. 1369, 1423 (1984); Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat.
3, 99 (2004); Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202, 110 Stat. 56,
110-12.
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July 2006, the Commission released an order, as required under the bien-
nial (now quadrennial) review process established by Congress in the Tele-
communications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"),5 launching its third such re-
view of the limits on broadcast ownership.6 This debate promises to be no
less controversial than it was the last time around, when Commissioner
Copps exclaimed:
Don't tell me that those of us who feel strongly about this are being too emotional ....
As for the emotion, I have seen the concern, the deep feeling and outright alarm on the
faces of people who have come out to talk to Commissioner Adelstein and me all
across this broad land. Are they emotional? You bet. And I think they are going to stay
that way until we get this right.
7
However the Commission resolves this review process, running the judi-
cial gauntlet thereafter will not be easy. Following the Commission's ini-
tial 1998 Review, the D.C. Circuit rejected the basis for two of the Com-
mission's rules and went so far as to direct the Commission to repeal a
third, based on challenges that they were insufficiently deregulatory.8 Fol-
lowing the Commission's 2002 Review, the Third Circuit invalidated the
underlying basis for much of the Commission's decision,9 this time in light
of concerns that a different Commission had been too deregulatory.' ° In-
5 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56, 110-
11.
6 In re 2006 Quadrennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996; 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broad-
cast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996; Cross Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspapers; Rules
and Policies Concerning Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Markets;
Definition of Radio Markets, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 21 F.C.C.R. 8834
(June 21, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Notice]. The Commission's first review began in 1998.
See In re Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting;
Television Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Rules, Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R.
12903 (Aug. 5, 1999) [hereinafter 1998 Review]. The Commission's second review began
in 2002. In re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast
Ownerships Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996; Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspapers; Rules and
Policies Concerning Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Markets;
Definition of Radio Markets; Definition of Radio Markets for Areas Not Located in an
Arbitron Survey Area, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R.
13,620 (June 2, 2003) [hereinafter 2002 Review], affid in part and remanded in part, Pro-
metheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d. Cir. 2004), certs. denied, 125 S. Ct.
2902-04 (2005).
7 2002 Review, supra note 6, at 13,955 (Copps, Comm'r, dissenting).
8 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Fox 1), modi-
fied on reh'g, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Fox If); Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. v.
FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
9 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004), certs. denied, 125 S.
Ct. 2902-04 (2005).
10 Id. In the view of the Commission minority, the agency had "empower[ed] America's
new Media Elite with unacceptable levels of influence over the media on which our society
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deed, that court took the extraordinary step of preserving its stay of the
Commission's decision indefinitely, "pending our review of the Commis-
sion's action on remand, over which this panel retains jurisdiction."1' In
doing so, the Third Circuit has imposed a substantial further stay of any
changes to the very rules that Congress requires the Commission to re-
visit.,,
In its 2006 Review, the Commission will reassess a number of different
broadcast ownership rules, 13 some of which seem destined for substantial
relaxation. In the 2002 Review, the Commission recognized the need for
significant relief from its limits on cross-ownership of newspaper, radio,
and television stations, and the Third Circuit did not appear unreceptive to
such relief if structured consistently and articulated rationally. 14 While
some speculate that these cross-ownership limits are now less of a priority
for large media firms, which are concentrating much of their attention on
and our democracy so heavily depend." 2002 Review, supra note 6, at 13,951 (Copps,
Comm'r, dissenting).
11 Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 435. The Third Circuit's directive raises the interesting
question of whether challenges to the 2006 review will be transferred to it under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2112(a)(5). Ordinarily, transfer is appropriate following remand of "the same or [an]
interrelated proceeding," where necessary "to maintain continuity." See, e.g., Eschelon
Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 682, 682 (8th Cir. 2003) (order granting request for trans-
fer) (quoting Public Serv. Comm'n for New York v. FPC, 472 F.2d 1270, 1272 (D.C. Cir.
1992)). Here, however, the 2006 review will address not only the Third Circuit's remand,
but also a statutory mandate for a quadrennial review proceeding in light of the current state
of competition, independent of the remand order. It was for that reason that the Third Cir-
cuit itself rejected the argument for continuity and consistency, made by the FCC and other
parties seeking a transfer to the D.C. Circuit based on that court's 2002 remand of the pre-
vious review of the same rule. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 03-3388, at 4 (3d Cir.
Sept. 15, 2003) (order denying transfer motion). The panel majority rejected Chief Judge
Scirica's reliance in dissent on "the fundamental jurisprudential underpinning that agency
decisions on remand should be reviewed by the remanding court." Id. at 7.
12 The extension of this stay was not accompanied by any of the usual findings required
for equitable relief. Such relief seems in tension with the statutory requirement of periodic
review of these rules in section 202(h) of the 1996 Act, and the established principle that
"the function of the reviewing court ends when an error of law is laid bare." See FCC v.
Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 792 n.15 (1978) (quoting FPC v. Idaho
Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20 (1952)); see also FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134
(1940) (dissolving writ of mandamus issued following FCC's decision to implement differ-
ent result following remand); NLRB v. Food Store Employees Union, Local 347, 417 U.S.
1, 9-10 (1974); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 817-26
(1973).
13 The Commission has solicited comment on the local television and radio ownership
rules, the limits on newspaper/broadcast and radio/television cross-ownership, and the dual
network rule. 2006 Notice, supra note 6, 11-33. The quadrennial review no longer in-
cludes the national television ownership limits, but the Commission has asked whether the
new proceeding may and should reconsider the UHF discount used in calculating compli-
ance with those national limits. Id. 1 34-35. See also Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 396-97 (3d
Cir. 2004), certs. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2902-04 (2005).
14 Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 402-03.
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Internet-based strategies for delivering video programming, 5 the television
duopoly rule remains an open question. That rule, which is the focus of this
analysis, generally bars common ownership of any two of the top four
rated television stations in a single market, or any two stations in markets
with fewer than eight independently-owned full power television stations.'
6
Incumbent television broadcasters in smaller markets will be particularly
concerned over whether the Commission will be able to provide them
meaningful relief from the television duopoly rule in its 2006 Review, es-
pecially in light of these prior court decisions. 7
A lot will be riding on the answer to this question. Whatever the finan-
cial health of the "giants that own the TV networks and the cable sys-
tems,' 8 the future faced by owners of television stations in smaller mar-
kets is quite different. 9 These smaller-market firms are challenged by in-
creased competition for advertising revenues from cable, direct broadcast
satellite operators, and other emerging multichannel providers.20 They face
changing advertising demands based upon widespread Internet penetra-
tion.2' Their traditional compensation payments from ABC, CBS, Fox, and
NBC have been reversed, and they are losing their traditional exclusive
local distribution rights for popular network programming.22 Finally, they
are incurring substantial expenses associated with the 2009 Digital Televi-
sion ("DTV") transition,23 without thus far being able to deploy DTV
15 See Frank Ahrens, As FCC Digs Into Ownership, Big Media No Longer Cares,
WASH. POST, June 29, 2006, at Dl. But see In re Applications for Consent to the Assign-
ment and/or Transfer of Control of Licenses; Adelphia Communications Corporation, (and
subsidiaries, debtors-in-possession), Assignors, to Time Warner Cable Inc. (subsidiaries),
Assignees; Adelphia Communications Corporation, (and subsidiaries, debtors-in-
possession), Assignors and Transferors, to Comcast Corporation (subsidiaries), Assignees
and Transferees; Comcast Corporation, Transferor, to Time Warner Inc., Transferee; Time
Warner Inc., Transferor, to Comcast Corporation, Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 8203, 8366 (July 13, 2006) (Copps, Comm'r, dissenting) ("Believe me,
this party is far from over.").
16 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b) (2002) (codification of the duopoly rule).
17 See Letter from David K. Rehr, President & CEO, Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, to the
Honorable Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n (Feb. 8, 2006) [hereinafter
Rehr Letter], available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prodlecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-orpdf
=pdf&iddocument=6518324593.
18 2002 Review, supra note 6, at 13,953 (Copps, Comm'r, dissenting). See also id., at
13,981 & n.17 (citing 70% prime time share collectively held by five media conglomerates:
Viacom, Disney, AOL Time Warner, NewsCorp, and NBC/GE); id. at 13,982 (Adelstein,
Comm'r, dissenting) ("It is not the Commission's job to make sure every big television
network makes money....").









channel capacity to create new revenues of the kind that provide their
largely unregulated cable competitors with what the Commission has rec-
ognized to be a significant "competitive advantage.
' 24
In the face of these industry trends, even the Commission minority that
strongly opposed other deregulatory aspects of the 2002 review did not
seem to dispute the majority's conclusion that broadcasters' ability "to
compete successfully in the delivered video market is meaningfully and
negatively affected in mid-sized and smaller markets. 25 Moreover, in past
reviews, opponents of duopoly relief have focused their attention on the
prospects of "triopolies '' 26 and on other ownership rules, such as the news-
paper cross-ownership ban and the national ownership cap. With respect to
the duopoly rule, Commissioner Adelstein recognized in dissent that
"common ownership may be appropriate . . . in the smallest of markets
where proven localism gains may outweigh the diversity harms. 27
Still, there is no doubt that, at least for mid-sized markets, there remains
substantial opposition to further relaxation of the duopoly rule. This oppo-
sition stems from views about the "special role" that local television sta-
tions are perceived to play in our society, as "the primary source of news
and information. 28 It also reflects fears about the irreversibility of consoli-
dation and "homogenized" programming based on the "Clear Channeliza-
tion" of radio after the 1996 Act.29 In Commissioner Copps' view, that
experience "should terrify us as we consider visiting upon television and
newspapers what we have inflicted upon radio."3 Ultimately, the dispute
here may also reflect what has been identified as "the tension between sat-
isfying and shaping media experiences. 31
These competing views pose a real challenge for the Commission's 2006
Review of the television duopoly rule, particularly in light of the close
judicial scrutiny of the Commission's prior efforts and the inevitability of
further appeals this time around. This article highlights five key topics that
the Commission will inevitably face in this exercise, as to which it has not
always taken a consistent view. The Commission must first decide what,
24 2002 Review, supra note 6, 62.
25 Id. at 201. See also 2002 Review, supra note 6, at 13,953 (Copps, Comm'r, dissent-
ing); id. at 13,982 (Adelstein, Comm'r, dissenting).
26 See 2002 Review, supra note 6, 186 (permitting common ownership of three sta-
tions in markets with at least 18 stations).
27 Id. at 13,998.
28 1998 Review, supra note 6, 18 & n.34, 58, 68 & n. 119. Such views about "the
most influential of all communications media" are deep-seated. See In re Amendment of
Section 73.636(a) of the Commission's Rules relating to Multiple Ownership of Television
Broadcast Stations, 5 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1609, 6 (June 21, 1965) (proposing a "top
fifty" policy).
29 2002 Review, supra note 6, at 13,952, 13,988 (Copps, Comm'r, dissenting).
30 Id. at 13,952.
31 Ellen Goodman, Media Policy Out of the Box: Content Abundance, Attention Scar-
city, and the Failures of Digital Markets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1389, 1395 (2004).
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exactly, Section 202(h) means in the face of uncertainty about the future
effects of duopoly relief. It must then articulate more clearly its vision of
an economic market for "delivered video programming," and explain how
that market differs from the "marketplace of ideas." Its updated competi-
tion and diversity analyses must avoid the internal inconsistencies of its
past efforts, and its diversity analysis must address the dangers of relying
on the popularity of broadcast voices as a justification for legal restrictions
on them. Finally, the Commission must pay closer attention to the record in
assessing the need for a ban on top four station duopolies in the smaller
markets.
Since both the D.C. Circuit and the Third Circuit have made clear that
they will pay close attention to how the Commission's position does or
does not conform to its earlier views on these questions, it is important to
address each of them in light of the analytical framework relied upon by
the Commission in its 1998 and 2002 Reviews.
I. THE COMMISSION'S 2006 REVIEW OF THE TELEVISION
DUOPOLY RULE
A. Presumptive Deregulation: What Exactly Does Section 202(h) Mean in
the Face of Uncertainty About the Future?
In Fox Television Stations and Sinclair Broadcasting Group, 32 the D.C.
Circuit essentially concluded that the Commission had posed the wrong
question in its 1998 Review. Instead of asking whether there existed any
persuasive basis to keep the rules at issue, the agency had adopted a "wait-
and-see approach" in order to gather data as to whether there was a persua-
sive basis for revising or eliminating them. 33 Due to the absence of cer-
tainty as to what the effects of greater media consolidation might be on
competition and diversity, the court's shifting of this burden of persuasion
is an important one.34 As with the prior reviews, a threshold question in
32 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (Fox 1), modified on reh'g, 293
F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Fox I); Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C.
Cir. 2002).
33 FoxL 280 F.3d at 1042, 1044, 1048; Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 164.
34 For example, while the study commissioned by the FCC for the later 2002 review
"provide[d] evidence of substitution by consumers" among different media, it concluded
that it "cannot completely answer the question" about intermedia substitution for news and
information. Joel Waldfogel, Consumer Substitution Among Media 3 (Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n, Media Ownership Working Group, 2002). Similarly, the correlation between
ownership and viewpoint is one whose degree, the Commission found, "cannot be estab-
lished with any certitude." 2002 Review, supra note 6, 1 364.
[Vol. 15
Television Duopoly Rule
any anticipated court challenge to the Commission's 2006 Review will be
how section 202(h) of the 1996 Act affects the allocation of this burden in
the face of such uncertainty.35 And here, that question is complicated by
the different perspectives of the D.C. and Third Circuits.
The D.C. Circuit's colorful metaphor for section 202(h)-that it is akin
to Admiral Farragut's directive to "Damn the torpedoes! Full speed
ahead"36-is obvious hyperbole. That section directs the Commission to
repeal-or modify-an ownership rule only if it is able to determine that
the rule is no longer in the public interest. 7 The Third Circuit has upheld,38
and it is likely that the D.C. Circuit would now find reasonable, 39 a FCC
determination that the Commission may keep an ownership rule if it is
merely useful, rather than indispensable, to the agency's discharge of its
public interest mandate.' °
But how much discretion the Commission continues to have under sec-
tion 202(h) in determining that a rule meets this "useful" test is less clear.
Could the Commission make such a determination on a theory that elimi-
nating or relaxing it may have adverse effects that the Commission is still
unable to predict with any degree of certainty? Of course, the Commission
cannot obtain a free pass from its section 202(h) obligation by "simply
cry[ing] 'diversity!" '' 4' Nor can it do so because, unlike Admiral Farragut,
the Commission wants to "observe the effects" of taking a more modest
deregulatory speed.42 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit went further in Sinclair and
specifically rejected the decision not to deregulate based upon the exis-
tence of "unresolved questions" about intermedia substitutability.43 That
35 Quite apart from section 202(h), in a case involving cable multiple ownership limits
(to which that section does not apply), the D.C. Circuit appeared to view such limits
through the lens of the First Amendment, justifying unusually probing standards of judicial
review. Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In analyzing the
1998 review of the duopoly rule, however, the court rejected similar arguments for more
than rational basis review of that rule as incompatible with prior Supreme Court decisions
governing broadcast regulation. Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 167-69. This distinction underscores
the oddity of continuing to view broadcasting as a First Amendment stepchild, in an era
when viewing of cable and DBS programming has now surpassed that of local broadcast
stations.
36 Fox !, 280 F.3d at 1044.
37 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56.
38 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 390-95 (3d Cir. 2004), certs. de-
nied, 125 S. Ct. 2902-04 (2005).
39 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox I1), 293 F.3d 537, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
Cellco P'ship v. FCC, 357 F.3d 88 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (deferring to FCC interpretation of
virtually identical language in 47 U.S.C. § 161, the regulatory reform provision of which
the section 202(h) reviews are expressly made a "part"); Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 393-95
(analyzing Cellco).
40 Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 391-92.
41 Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 170 (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part).
42 Fox 1, 280 F.3d at 1042.
43 Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 164-65.
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court did not view this rationale as any more acceptable than the "wait and
see approach" it rejected in Fox.'
The Third Circuit has not squarely addressed how the Commission
should deal with the problem of uncertainty, or whether a Commission
"determin[ation]" that a rule continues to serve "the public interest" under
the language of section 202(h)45 could be justified where there is uncer-
tainty about the effects of further deregulation. That court has suggested,
however, that all section 202(h) does is extend the same requirement of
reasoned analysis, applicable to a decision to issue a new rule, to "the
Commission's decision to retain [an] existing [one]. 46
This view seems premised on the erroneous position that, prior to the en-
actment of section 202(h), the agency had no such obligation "periodically
to justify its existing regulations. '47 As other courts have recognized in
dealing with FCC ownership restrictions, "where the factual assumptions
which support an agency rule are no longer valid, agencies ordinarily must
reexamine their approach. 48 Thus, whether it has merely a "deregulatory
tenor" or rises to the level of a "deregulatory presumption, '49 section
202(h) must have been intended to mean something more than what exist-
ing administrative law principles already required.50 And at some point,
particularly in light of the extensive opportunity the Commission has had
to assess the effects of local marketing agreements ("LMAs") on local
television markets,51 it becomes more difficult to justify continued regula-
tion on the basis of uncertainties that the Commission has not taken the
initiative to resolve. Indeed, in its 2002 Review, the Commission already
seemed to conclude that LMAs had not "facilitat[ed] the exercise of market
44 Id.
45 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56 ("The
Commission... shall determine whether any [ownership rules] are necessary in the public
interest as the result of competition. The Commission shall repeal or modify any regulation
it determines to be no longer in the public interest.").
46 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 390-95 (3d Cir. 2004), certs de-
nied, 125 S. Ct. 2902-04 (2005).
47 id.
48 Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 69 F.3d 752, 767 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Bechtel v.
FCC, 957 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 816 (1992)). See also
Geller v. FCC, 610 F.2d 973, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1979); accord., In re 1998 Biennial Regulatory
Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules
Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Notice of In-
quiry, 13 F.C.C.R. 11,276, 11,302 (Mar. 12, 1998) [hereinafter 1998 NO]] (separate state-
ment of Comm'r Furchtgott-Roth).
49 Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 445 (Scirica, C.J., dissenting).
50 The cardinal principle of statutory construction that presumes that Congress does not
legislate superfluously has particular force with respect to the regulatory review provisions
of the 1996 Act, the overriding purpose of which was "to provide for a pro-competitive, de-
regulatory national policy ..." H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 113 (1996).
S1 See Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (describing
the Commission's approach to LMAs).
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power" against advertisers, and had actually increased the likelihood of
52local news coverage.
In any event, a Commission decision not to 'wait and see' in the face of
such uncertainties should be able to withstand judicial scrutiny, assuming
that it is based upon an adequate record and carefully and consistently ex-
plained. 3 The Supreme Court, in the leading case involving the scope of
judicial review of deregulation, has held: "[A]n agency may ... revoke a
standard on the basis of serious uncertainties if supported by the record and
reasonably explained."54 In other words, repeal or relaxation of a rule need
not require an affirmative demonstration that the status quo is wrong; it can
simply be based on a showing that "there is no cause to believe that the
status quo is right.,
55
Although reversing the Commission's 2002 Review, the Third Circuit it-
self acknowledged this point.56 It upheld the Commission's rejection of a
blanket ban on newspaper-broadcast combinations, on the basis that "the
Commission reasonably concluded that it did not have enough confidence
in the proposition that commonly owned outlets have a uniform bias" to
warrant sustaining that ban.57 Thus, in its 2006 Review, the Commission
similarly should be free to resolve legitimate uncertainties about the need
for the duopoly rule as presently drafted in favor of modifying it, however
section 202(h) is interpreted.
B. The Marketplace of Ideas Versus the Market for "Delivered Video
Programming"
For many years the Commission identified two justifications for its
broadcast multiple ownership rules: a desire to maximize diversification of
program and service viewpoints, and a concern about "undue concentration
52 2002 Review, supra note 6, 159.
53 Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 389-90 (court will defer to an agency's decisions so long as
the agency provides a reasonable explanation for its action).
54 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 51-52
(1983). The Court so held even after rejecting MVMA's argument that the Administrative
Procedure Act embodied a presumption in favor of deregulation. However, just as contin-
ued regulation cannot be premised on the existence of uncertainties that the agency takes no
reasonable efforts to resolve, the Court cautioned that the agency must supply a justification
for eliminating a rule without first "engaging in a search for further evidence." Id. at 52. As
noted above, the Commission has undertaken to include further studies in its 2006 review
that will continue that search.
55 Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest v. Dep't of the Treasury, 797 F.2d 995, 999 (D.C.
Cir. 1986).




of economic power." 8 In the 2002 Review, the Commission decided to
grant only limited relief from the duopoly rule because of competition, not
diversity, concerns.59
The debate about "how much diversity is enough" will undoubtedly con-
tinue in the 2006 Review of this rule, given updated data reflecting more
recent marketplace developments.' Yet the Commission addressed that
question definitively in the 2002 Review of the duopoly rule.61 While it
declined to equate the benefits of greater program diversity from a duopoly
combination with what it viewed as greater opportunities for viewpoint
diversity from separate ownership, the Commission acknowledged that
duopolies have led to greater investment in news and other informational
programming of the kind that forms the touchstone of its diversity analy-
sis. 62 The Commission also relied heavily on other media outlets in supply-
ing viewpoint diversity. It noted that there are "countless other sources of
news and information available to the public,"63 that "data strongly suggest
58 In re Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240 and 3.636 of the Rules and Regulations
Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, Report and
Order, 18 F.C.C. 288, 291-92 (Nov. 25, 1953). Accord, FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for
Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 780 (1978); 1998 Review, supra note 6, 1 15 ("'twin goals' of compe-
tition and diversity"). The Commission has more recently added concerns about "localism"
to the mix. See 2002 Review, supra note 6, 73-79. By "localism," the Commission refers
not to local ownership (an earlier FCC policy) but to what are at least arguably program
content judgments: "the selection of programming responsive to local needs and interests,
and local news quantity and quality." Id. 78. While this addition appears to have reflected
concerns that media consolidation would diminish the quantity or quality of local program-
ming, the 2002 review found essentially the opposite to be the case. Id. in 157-69. Owner-
ship regulation is a clumsy way to address such concerns, and the Commission has a sepa-
rate proceeding designed to address them, through "behavioral rules that promote localism,
regardless of identity of ownership." In re Broadcast Localism, Notice of Inquiry, 19
F.C.C.R. 12,425, 5 (June 7, 2004) [hereinafter Broadcast Localism NOI]. The Democratic
minority have sought to resolve that proceeding as a condition to any changes to the owner-
ship rules. 2006 Notice, supra note 6, at 2 (Adelstein, Comm'r, concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
59 2002 Review, supra note 6, 620-21.
60 Those developments have suggested to one observer that the problem today is not a
lack of sufficient viewpoints, but limits on viewers' capacity to absorb them all, together
with new tools allowing viewers to screen them out. Goodman, supra note 31, at 1395.
61 The Third Circuit cautioned that "the degree to which the Commission can rely on
cable or the Internet" for viewpoint diversity "is limited," based on the prior record. Prome-
theus, 373 F.3d at 415. See discussion infra Part II.D.
62 2002 Review, supra note 6, 157-69. These issues about the relative advantages and
disadvantages of group ownership are not new. See Howard, supra note 2, at 35-39 (sum-
marizing testimony at FCC's 1958 network study hearings), 47-56 (consideration of pro-
posed top 50 policy), 59-60 (NAB study opposing one-to-a-market proposal). See also In re
Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission's Rules Relating to
Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Stations, Second Report and Order,
50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1063-65 (Jan. 28, 1975) (subsequent history omitted) (discussing the
benefits of newspaper cross-ownership).
63 2002 Review, supra note 6, 178.
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that media can be viable substitutes for one another for the dissemination
of news, information and viewpoint expression," ' and that "the majority of
markets have an abundance of viewpoint diversity. 65
A much more interesting feature of the 2002 Review of the duopoly rule
was its new wrinkle on the traditional competition analysis. The Commis-
sion concluded that "some limitations on local television ownership are
necessary to promote competition, 66 even though unnecessary for diver-
sity reasons. 67 Traditionally, the Commission's competition analysis had
centered on only two economic markets, both of which involve products
that television stations actually sell (advertising) or buy (programming).68
In the 2002 Review, the Commission decided essentially to ignore these
traditional markets and to focus almost entirely on a third ostensible eco-
nomic market for delivered video programming ("DVP"), something that
local broadcast stations neither sell nor buy.69
In the Commission's view, the participants in the DVP market-which it
also referred to as the market for "watching television ' '7° -included fewer
and less robust competitors than those in the broader marketplace of ideas
that formed the basis of its diversity analysis.7' Because the Commission's
analytical distinction between these two was essential to its decision in
retaining the duopoly rule largely unaltered as it applies to smaller mar-
kets,72 it warrants a careful reexamination in the 2006 Review. Perhaps the
distinction was designed to finesse the more elusive question about how to
measure viewpoint diversity,73 allowing the Commission to point out that it
was maintaining stricter limits for competitive reasons and thereby moot-
ing diversity issues.74 As noted below, however, it can be argued that this
analysis failed to identify either the real participants in the relevant eco-
nomic market, those who may have actual market power in it, or those who
64 Id. T 405.
65 Id. T 171.
66 Id. 133.
67 Id.
68 Id. T 60.
69 The Commission's discounting of the advertising market seems to have been based in
large part on the fact that it is an attenuated measure of viewer preferences that does not
reflect the intensity of those preferences. Id.
70 Id. 142.
71 Id. 142, 179.
72 See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 386-87 (3d Cir. 2004), certs.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 2902-04 (2005).
73 See FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 796 (1978); see also
2006 Notice, supra note 6, 32 ("[W]e recognize that some aspects of diversity may be
difficult to quantify."); 1998 NOI, supra note 48, at 1304-05 (separate statement of
Comm'r Michael Powell); 1998 Review, supra note 6, at 12,987-89 (separate statement of
Comm'r Michael Powell).
74 2002 Review, supra note 6, 178.
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have the potential ability to fill any programming needs that local broad-
casters might ignore.
The Commission first raised the idea of a DVP market in a 1995 notice.75
It was based on the observation that, over a thirty-year period, a relatively
constant share of Americans' leisure time has been devoted to watching
television,76 even though "the price of subscribing to cable and DBS has
increased faster than the rate of inflation. 77 This phenomenon led the
Commission to conclude in its 2002 Review that there are no adequate
substitutes for video programming, and thus that the relevant product mar-
ket is "no broader than" DVP.78 The Commission's next step in the analy-
sis was not entirely clear. Finding it unlikely that a television station du-
opoly "would affect the competitive strategy of a national cable network"
in light of the latter's national foCUS, 79 the Commission concluded that uni-
lateral or coordinated actions by local stations "may result in potential
competitive harms."
This competition analysis raises a number of issues. As a threshold mat-
ter, it seems inconsistent with the Commission's recognition that duopolies
have in fact resulted in more and better programming in the larger markets
where they are permitted. 8' Another oddity about relying on an economic
market for watching television is that it seems to replicate the Comniis-
sion's diversity analysis, by assessing what kinds of programming choices
viewers may have. The Commission itself had previously raised concern
that these two concepts may not really differ, and elsewhere in the 2002
Review it seemed to conflate them, acknowledging not only the abundant
sources of viewpoint diversity but also "the myriad sources of competition"
75 In re Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting;
Television Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Rules, Further Notice of Proposed Rule-
making, 10 F.C.C.R. 3524, app. C 24 (Dec. 15, 1994).
76 In 1970, 46.5% of Americans' leisure time was spent watching television; in 1998,
the figure was 15.3%. Id. 24. In the 2002 review, the Commission updated this data to
reflect a figure of 46.1% (as of 2000). 2002 Review, supra note 6, 142 n.284. See also In
re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996; Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspapers; Rules and Policies Con-
cerning Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Markets; Definition of
Radio Markets, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 18,503, 89-91 (Sept. 23,
2002) [hereinafter 2002 NPRM].
77 2002 Review, supra note 6, 142.
78 Id.
79 Id. 191.
80 Id. 1 145; see also id. 191.
81 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
82 2002 NPRM, supra note 76, 92.
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to local television stations" 3 -including "competition from other sources of
DVP." 4
The notion of identifying an economic market, in which broadcasters
possess market power in offering a product for free, based on the fact that
viewers continue to watch television despite cable price hikes, is also
somewhat counterintuitive. The idea does not appear to have had any re-
cord support. Dr. Bruce Owen, upon whose statement the Commission
purportedly relied in its 2002 Review, 5 did not say that local television
stations compete in such a market.8 6 Indeed, he argued that the Commis-
sion should abandon entirely its effort to prescribe economic markets in
establishing broadcast ownership rules, asserting that it is an exercise that
unnecessarily duplicates the antitrust laws and ignores competing alterna-
tives.8 7 In a world in which "consumers have demonstrated their willing-
ness to adopt new media," Owen concluded that the Commission's eco-
nomic markets analysis "makes no more sense... than for King Canute to
order away the ocean's waves. ''88
The term "delivered video programming" originated from completely
different concerns about the power of cable operators,8 9 in a market recog-
83 2002 Review, supra note 6, 1 133.
84 Id. 212. The absence of any "coherently defined market" suggests "motivations for
the broadcast ownership rules beyond purely economic objectives." Howard A. Shelanski,
Antitrust Law as Mass Media Regulation: Can Merger Standards Protect the Public Inter-
est?, 94 CAL. L. REv. 371, 389, 392 n.l11 (2006). See also Goodman, supra note 31, at
1395 n.1 1 ("[C]ompetition is desired for noneconomic reasons, [because] it duplicates the
diversity goal.").
85 See 2002 Review, supra note 6, 141.
86 The 2002 review cited this report's reference to "ordinary commercial markets for the
sale of advertising, the purchase of programming, and (in the case of multichannel video
program distributors, certain internet service providers, and print media), the compilation
of content packages and the provision of transmission services for sale to customers." See
id. at 13,671 n.280 (citing In re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Com-
mission's Broadcast Ownerships Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspa-
pers; Rules and Policies Concerning Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in
Local Markets; Definition of Radio Markets; Definition of Radio Markets for Areas Not
Located in an Arbitron Survey Area, Comments of Fox Entm't Corp. Inc., Fox Television
Stations, Inc., Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. and Telemundo Commc'ns Group, Inc., and Viacom
[hereinafter Fox/NBC/Viacom Comments], Statement of Bruce M. Owen, MB Docket Nos.
02-277, 01-235, 01-317, 00-244, at 1-2 (Jan. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Owen Statement]) (em-
phasis added). As this statement implicitly recognizes, local television stations do not com-
pete in providing such compilations, and they do not charge for such programming.
87 Owen Statement, supra note 86, at 2.
88 Id. at 3. Cf Shelanski, supra note 84, at 402-19. Although Professor Shelanski identi-
fies limits on the ability of antitrust analysis to address efficiency issues in media mergers, a
number of those issues are common to problems with the Commission's analysis identified
above.
89 47 U.S.C. § 521 (2000) (findings of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992).
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nized to include only multichannel video programming distributors
("MVPDs"). In the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competi-
tion Act of 1992 ("1992 Cable Act"),9  Congress directed the Commission
to file annual reports on the status of competition "in the market for the
delivery of video programming."'" This market was never viewed (then or
now) as one that would include broadcast television stations. Indeed, for
purposes of cable rate regulation, the 1992 Cable Act repealed the Com-
mission's prior definition of effective competition for cable operators,
which had been based on the number of local broadcast stations, in favor of
a definition that includes only DBS and other MVPDs as competitors.92
The Commission's video competition reports since that time have consis-
tently reflected this same policy. While recognizing that broadcast stations
may have a potentially constraining effect on cable market power, the
Commission concluded that "there is no close substitute for that steadily-
expanding complement of specialized program services offered by the
typical cable system," 93 and that "broadcast television as a transmission
medium is insufficient to constrain cable market power." 94 The Commis-
sion's most recent video competition report continues to define the video
programming market as one for distribution of multichannel video pro-
gramming.95
Thus, the Commission's observation that the relevant economic market
may be "no broader" than all video programming begs four questions.
First, if the analysis turns on ability to raise prices, why is the relevant
market not the narrower one in which MVPDs charge for such program-
ming, as Congress and the Commission have previously recognized? 96
Second, if cable operators have been able not only to increase their rates
but also to do so while surpassing the audience share enjoyed by local tele-
90 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
9' 47 U.S.C. § 548(g) (2000).
92 § 543(a)(1).
93 In re Implementation of Section 19 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market
for the Delivery of Video Programming, First Report, 9 F.C.C.R. 7442, 1 43 (Sept. 19,
1994).
94 In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery
of Video Programming, Second Annual Report, 11 F.C.C.R. 2060,1 115 (Dec. 7, 1995).
95 In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery
of Video Programming, Twelfth Annual Report, 21 F.C.C.R. 2503, 143 (Feb. 10, 2006)
[hereinafter Twelfth Video Competition Report].
96 The Commission noted that MVPDs' subscriber-based business model is "a competi-
tive dynamic for which our competitive analysis should account." 2002 Review, supra note
6, 64. Strangely, however, it sought to account for this "competitive advantage" over
broadcasters by adding broadcasters into the same market and then finding that they may




vision stations,97 why did the Commission conclude that its competitive
concern should be with local television stations, which are made subject to
the duopoly rule, rather than with local cable operators, which are not?
Third, why would the Commission focus its competition analysis on the
indifference of national cable networks to program choices made by local
television stations, when in its diversity analysis the Commission recog-
nized, consistent with its prior views, that cable operators can provide lo-
cal viewers with alternative programs and viewpoints? And what about the
ability of other television stations in the market to do so? Fourth, as noted
above, how can there be concerns about the lack of competitive constraints
on television stations' delivery of video programming if duopolies have in
fact led to more and better programming?
By ignoring cable operators in this competition analysis of the DVP
market, the Commission also failed in the 2002 Review fully to address the
concerns of the D.C. Circuit in Sinclair.98 In that case, the D.C. Circuit
declined to consider whether the requirement of eight independent voices
in a local television market was "plucked out of thin air," 99 warning that it
would "leave [that consideration] for another day. ' ° What it found fatal
was the fact that the Commission had counted voices differently for the
cross-ownership rule than it did for the duopoly rule.'O Although the
Commission had determined that the inclusion of radio, cable, and news-
paper outlets for purposes of the former rule "more accurately reflects the
actual level of diversity and competition in the market,"'' 0 2 it excluded these
outlets for purposes of the duopoly rule. 10 3 In its 2002 Review, the Com-
mission only partially addressed this inconsistency. As noted above, it con-
cluded that media outlets other than television stations "contribute to view-
point diversity in local markets.""1° But the Commission confined Sin-
97 The 1988 data relied upon by the Commission indicated that local television stations
enjoyed over four times the viewing of cable networks. By the 2004-05 television season,
the combined audience share of all nonbroadcast networks had exceeded that of local televi-
sion stations by a substantial margin (59% vs. 41%). Twelfth Video Competition Report,
supra note 95, 165. To be sure, a local station's share will generally exceed that of any
one cable network, many of which serve very niche audiences. But the issue here is whether
a cable operator can adjust its programming selections to meet any viewer needs unfulfilled
by local broadcast stations. Id.
98 Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
99 Id. at 162. The Commission had earlier suggested that six, not eight, should be ade-
quate for this purpose. Id. at 153. In the 2002 review, it abandoned this voice test entirely
(for duopolies). As noted below, the Third Circuit remanded that issue, although its analysis
appears to have centered on concerns about the voice test for triopolies. Prometheus Radio
Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 418-20 (3d Cir. 2004); 2006 Notice, supra note 6, U 13, 16,
18 (seeking comment on validity of outlet rather than audience share test).
1oo Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 162.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 164 (quoting 1998 Review, supra note 6, 1 107) (emphasis added).
103 Id.
104 2002 Review, supra note 6, 1 133.
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clair's relevance to its diversity analysis.'05 This reading of Sinclair, which
had found the role of other outlets inconsistently addressed in both the
Commission's "diversity and competition" analyses, was incomplete.'
°6
In short, the competitive concerns that led the Commission to permit
only very limited duopoly relief in smaller markets reflected a market
analysis that raises a number of questions. For example, what constitutes
the market for 'watching television'? Who are the sellers in that market,
and how able are they to respond to program choices made by local televi-
sion stations? Have the programming choices made by duopolies provided
any evidence of power in this putative market? The Commission's market
analysis also attempted to finesse the Sinclair court's concern about ignor-
ing local cable outlets for competition as well as diversity purposes. Since
the 2002 Review's basis for continuing duopoly restrictions turned primar-
ily on the Commission's conclusions about this DVP market, the 2006
Review should include a careful look at these questions.
C. Competition in the Video Advertising Market
Another traditional focal point of the Commission's multiple ownership
analyses has been the competitive effect of consolidation on advertisers. In
its 2002 Review, the Commission found that the then existing duopoly rule
was "not necessary to promote competition in the video advertising mar-
ket"; its primary concern involved competition in the DVP market de-
scribed above.° 7 The Commission was concerned with the impact of du-
opolies on the advertising market only secondarily, to the extent that com-
petition in this market "adds an extra level of protection."'' 0 8 It is thus un-
clear how much the Commission intended to rely on its competition analy-
sis of this market, but because that analysis reflects the kinds of internal
inconsistencies that the courts have found troubling in the past, the ap-
proach warrants rethinking in the 2006 Review.
On the one hand, the Commission was not persuaded by economic stud-
ies demonstrating that advertisers rely on cable and other outlets including
broadcast television stations. Instead, the Commission viewed television
stations as able to price discriminate against those advertisers who do not
'0' Id. 171.
106 Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 164. In its earlier review, the Commission had deemed its eight
station test to be "necessary for two reasons." First, it was concerned about the unique role
of television for diversity purposes. Second, it was "unable to reach a definitive conclusion"
about substitutes for television stations "in the advertising and delivered video program-
ming markets." Thus, the restriction was imposed to ensure "that markets remain suffi-
ciently diverse and competitive." 1998 Review, supra note 6, 1 68-70 (emphasis added).
See also 2002 Biennial Review, supra note 76, 176.




view these other outlets as adequate substitutes.' °9 This view was not based
on contrary economic studies; in fact, the Commission's own study "d[id]
not attempt to address whether cable television ... compete[s] with local
television .. .for local advertising dollars."' l" ° A survey of actual inter-
views with "media buyers and agency representatives" showed that they
"almost unanimously discounted the possibility" of such price discrimina-
tion."' The Commission, however, took the position that only broadcast-
ers, and not their local cable competitors, have a keen understanding of
advertisers, based on their repeated interaction."'
The Commission had previously indicated an inclination to include cable
in the same advertising market,' 3 and elsewhere in the 2002 Review the
Commission acknowledged a study suggesting that it is cable that "may
have market power over some local advertisers."'"14 It also cited with ap-
proval two other studies demonstrating that joint operation of stations
through LMAs is "unlikely to result in any competitive harm to local ad-
vertisers.""' 5 The Commission must address this issue with more consis-
tency in the 2006 Review.
The Commission will also presumably address cable's growing share in
of the viewing audience" 16 as well as its growing ability to compete more
effectively in the advertising market by clustering. 1"' Even in 2002, the
Commission's staff study recognized that cable advertising had been
"growing much faster" than broadcast advertising." 8 Moreover, the Com-
mission's most recent video competition report notes that cable operators'
local advertising revenues have increased by 12% in each of the last two
years." 9 And local online advertising is predicted to grow by 31% in 2007,
'09 Id. 152, nn. 298-99.
110 C. Anthony Bush, FCC Media Ownership Working Group, The Substitutability of
Local Newspaper, Radio, and Television Advertising in Local Business Sales 4 (2002). The
Commission did cite the statement of Hearst-Argyle that television stations have advantages
over "niche boutique cable network offerings." 2002 Review, supra note 6, at n.296 (citing
Bear Steams Comments). Here, again, however, the relevant comparison is to local cable
operators, not cable networks.
"1' Comments of Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. ex. 8, at 30 (Jan. 2, 2003), cited in 2002
Review, supra note 6, at nn.298-99.
112 2002 Review, supra note 6, at 13,676 n.299.
"3 2002 Biennial Review, supra note 76, 87.
114 2002 Review, supra note 6, at 13,676 n.297.
"' Id.jj 153.
"6 See Twelfth Video Competition Report, supra note 95, 165.
117 1998 Review, supra note 6, 1 37.
118 Jonathan Levy, et al., Broadcast Television: Survivor in a Sea of Competition 12
(FCC Office of Plans and Policy, Working Paper No. 37, 2002) [hereinafter OPP Study].
119 Twelfth Video Competition Report, supra note 95, at tbl.4. This trend has continued,
and is expected to continue at least through 2009. See NCTA, Cable Advertising Revenue:
1985-2006, available at http://ncta.com/ContentView.aspx?contentld=70; Comments of




to $7.7 billion. 2° In light of these trends, it is certainly worth examining
whether there remain significant numbers of advertisers "that do not have
good substitutes for broadcast television."'
' 21
D. Intermedia Substitutability
As noted above, the Commission found in its 2002 Review of the du-
opoly rule that "media outlets other than television stations contribute sig-
nificantly to viewpoint diversity in local markets," and that competitive
forces would ensure program diversity. 22 The principal fear of many op-
ponents of greater duopoly relief in smaller markets is that there are gener-
ally fewer television stations in these markets and that, notwithstanding the
proliferation of other media voices, the public still depends upon local
television stations as its primary sources of local news and information.'23
The D.C. Circuit rejected the basis for this factual assumption in the 1998
Review as undocumented. 24 In fact, ascertaining the extent of reliance
upon local television stations for news and informational programming has
proven extraordinarily difficult for the Commission.
125
More than twenty years ago, the Commission concluded that it should
include radio, cable, other video media, and print media in assessing "the
information market relevant to diversity." '26 Given the far greater number
of information sources available to the public today and their use as com-
plements rather than substitutes, 27 it is unclear why reaching a conclusion
120 See Borell Associates, Outlook for 2007: Pac-Man Pace for Local Online Ads (Ex-
ecutive Summary, Sept. 2006), at 2, available at
http://www.borrellassociates.com/report.cfm (free registration required for download).
121 2002 Review, supra note 6, 152.
122 Id. 176-82.
123 Id. N 173-75. Of course, this fear also assumes that duopolies will reduce the diver-
sity of viewpoints expressed (or potentially expressible) by local stations. This is a much
debated point. Id.
124 Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 163-64 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The
1997 Roper poll relied upon by the Commission for this proposition did suggest that (back
then) viewers preferred broadcast over cable programming. But the court noted that the
Roper poll said nothing about viewers' preferred sources of news. Id.
125 See 1998 Review, supra note 6, 33 (noting the "unresolved questions" about "inter-
media substitutability"); see also Shelanski, supra note 84, at 393 nn.113-14, 403-4
nn. 142-46.
126 In re Amendment of Section 73.3555 [formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636]
of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television
Broadcast Stations, Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, 25 (July 26, 1984); In re
Amendment of Section 73.3555 [formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636] of the
Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast
Stations, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 74 (Dec. 19, 1984) [hereinafter
Amendment of Section 73.3555].
127 According to a recent Pew survey, "[h]alf of the public uses multiple news sources on
a typical day." PEW RESEARCH CTR. BIENNIAL NEWS CONSUMPION SURVEY; ONLINE
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as to their relative usage rates is necessary for purposes of the duopoly
rule. 12 8 Relative usage rates may have some bearing on how to set the
number of radio versus newspaper outlets in a market that can be co-owned
with a television station for purposes of the cross-ownership rule. In fact, it
is within that context that the Commission developed the Diversity Index
reflecting its judgment about substitutability. 129 In contrast, the Commis-
sion's diversity analysis for the duopoly rule in its 2002 Review continued
to rely on the fact that "countless other sources of news and information"
are "available," regardless of whether, or to what extent, they are actually
used. 30
Even in calculating the Diversity Index for purposes of the cross-
ownership rule, the Commission was neither definitive nor internally con-
sistent on this point. It adopted a usage measure as one of its "conservative
assumptions" about viewpoint diversity. 13' It then weighted various differ-
ent media by usage data derived from one of the studies it commis-
sioned. 132 Yet the Commission declined to weight outlets within the same
medium (e.g., all local television stations) on a usage basis because "cur-
rent behavior is not necessarily an accurate predictor of future behavior,"
and "media outlets can change the amount of news and current affairs that
they offer" in response to competitive conditions "at very low marginal
coSt.' ' 133 In this context, the Commission relied not on the content citizens
actually access, but on what viewpoints "have an opportunity to reach"
them. 134 Then, in the case of the Internet, the Commission reverted to a
usage test to differentiate telephone and cable modem subscribers.1
35
Not surprisingly, these inconsistencies proved fatal for the Diversity In-
dex in the Third Circuit's review. Rejecting the idea that a community col-
lege television station could "mak[e] a greater contribution to viewpoint
diversity than a conglomerate that includes the third-largest newspaper in
PAPERS MODESTLY BOOST NEWSPAPER READERSHIP 11 (2006), available at http://people-
press.org/reports/pdf/282.pdf [hereinafter 2006 Pew Survey].
128 Amendment of Section 73.3555, supra note 126, 20 ("The fact that the various me-
dia may not be perfect substitutes for one another does not negate their status as competing,
antagonistic sources of information for the purposes of diversity analysis").
129 2002 Review, supra note 6, 409.
130 Id. 178 (emphasis added).
131 Id. T 399. Another of these assumptions was to disregard cable news channels and
news sources over the Internet that are national in scope. The Commission has recognized,
however, that such information can be no less critical to an informed citizenry than purely
local information. See Broadcast Localism NOI, supra note 48, 14 (citing In re Revision
of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and Pro-
gram Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 358, 15 (May 1, 1986).
132 Nielsen Media Research, FCC Media Ownership Working Group: Consumer Survey
on Media Usage, 8 tbl.8 (2002) [hereinafter MOWG Study 8].





America," '36 the court seemed to call for a usage test rather than an avail-
ability test. But as those who would apply market analysis to the market-
place of ideas have recognized, market share is a concept ill-suited to
measuring viewpoints. 37 As long as viewpoints are not suppressed, there
would seem to be no failure in the marketplace of ideas-unless one sub-
scribes to the notion that the FCC should strive to ensure some sort of ideo-
logical parity, under which "all ideas should be equally popular."'' 38 That
notion would seem at odds with established doctrine that "the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market ....
Indeed, a duopoly rule that reflects "concer[n] with the communicative
impact" of one speaker as compared to another would seem to raise sub-
stantial First Amendment concerns if it is based on the speaker's content. 40
It may not be fatal to limit the outlets one firm may own in a market with-
out reference to content, "in order to enhance the relative voice of oth-
ers,"14' at least under the current First Amendment model for broadcast
regulation.142 But "pick[ing] winners and losers in the marketplace to serve
136 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372,408 (2004), certs. denied, 125 S. Ct.
2902-04 (2005).
137 Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69
ANTITRUST L.J. 249, 275-78 (2001).
138 Owen Statement, supra note 86, at 8-9.
139 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., dissent-
ing). See also Shelanski, supra note 84, at 386-87 nn.81-82. For an interesting perspective
on the difficulties of the less circulated thought to "get itself accepted" in today's Informa-
tion Age, see Philip J. Weiser, The Ghost of Telecommunications Past, 103 MICH. L. REV.
1671, 1692-93 (2005) (describing network effects of more popular programs on public
discourse).
140 Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 658 (1994). Concerns about "Big
Media," or the "drumbeat of one-sided talk shows," or "pumped-in, homogenized, syndi-
cated programming," also seem to border on such qualitative judgments. 2002 Review,
supra note 6, at 13,957, 13,959 (Copps, Comm'r, dissenting), 13988 (Adelstein, Comm'r,
dissenting).
141 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976). See also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 790-91 n.31 (1978) ("[Tlhe fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is
hardly a reason to suppress it"). Accord, Amendment of Section 73.3555, supra note 126, at
20 ("The fact that the government may fear the persuasive power of this organ of the press
does not mean that the First Amendment allows it to act on those fears.").
142 See FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 799-800 (1978). The
analysis holds for cable as well. See Time Warner Entm't Co. L.P. v. United States, 211
F.3d 1313, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (rejecting facial challenge to cable horizontal cap and
channel occupancy limits); U.S. WEST, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir.
1994), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 516 U.S. 1155 (1996) (refusing to apply




some hazy notions of diversity" is an exercise the Commission should
think carefully about embarking upon in the context of the duopoly rule.'43
Nevertheless, in light of the Third Circuit's decision, factual questions
about the availability and use of other local news and information outlets
will be a key part of the 2006 Review. As noted above, such questions
have proven difficult to resolve in the past. Last time around, the FCC
commissioned a study that purported to address such questions more spe-
cifically than the 1997 Roper poll criticized in Sinclair. The Commission
ultimately found the results of that study, too, to be unreliable.' 44 The study
reported that of those who got their local news from television, 67%
watched it on "broadcast television channels" and 58% watched it on "ca-
ble or satellite news channels.' ' 45 However, the Commission refused to
credit this data, because it found that cable subscriber respondents may
have misunderstood the source of local broadcast news programs received
over cable, and because the data did not line up with the low audience rat-
ings for local cable channels."4 Accordingly, because of the absence of
accurate data, and in order "to simplify [its] general analysis," the Com-
mission excluded cable from that analysis. 47 It undertook to review the
matter more carefully in its next review, 148 and the Third Circuit upheld
this decision.
49
The Commission has taken these data limitations to heart and will under-
take additional surveys in the course of its 2006 Review in order to refine
the information and update it in light of market developments. One key
question is how meaningful the importance of television news really is for
these purposes. The most recent biennial Pew survey of news consumption,
released in July 2006, confirms that television remains the most popular
source of news, and that regular use of local television news (54%) is still
about the same as it was six years ago (56%).150 However, local content
does not appear to be as important a reason for watching television as it is
for reading the newspaper.' 51 Moreover, those who follow local govern-
ment news cited newspapers (53%) over television (45%) as their pre-
143 See In re Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, Report and
Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 3094, 3242 (Apr. 9, 1991) (Quello, Comm'r, dissenting), vacated sub
nom., Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1992). See also She-
lanski, supra note 84, at 411 n.172.
'44 See 2002 Review, supra note 6, 413 (suggesting data from the study to be unreli-
able).
145 MOWG Study 8, supra note 132, at tbl.8. Cf 2002 Review, supra note 6, 413 (using
the figure of 46.4%, rather than 58%, for cable).
146 2002 Review, supra note 6, 414.141 Id. T 408.
148 id.
149 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 404-08 (3rd Cir. 2004), certs de-
nied, 125 S. Ct. 2904 (2005).
150 2006 Pew Survey, supra note 127, at 11-12, 56-59, 62.
15' Id. at 30.
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dominant source for local content.' That preference was even stronger for
those who follow news about people and events in their community (61%
for newspapers versus 34% for television).'53 According to the Pew survey,
the public appears to rely on television much more for national and interna-
tional news as well as weather, sports, and breaking news."
Another important issue for the 2006 Review will be how many cable
subscribers now have access to local cable news channels. As of 2002, the
figure was only about one-third. 155 Even then, however, the Commission
noted that local news programming available on cable channels had been
increasing, and that "cable ... is becoming a more important source of
local news and information."' 5 6 The FCC staff study relied upon by the
Third Circuit confirmed this point, noting that cable news was "increas-
ingly moving into smaller markets" in light of "the lower cost of digital
production," and that "many predict that regional news programs could
become a significant competitive force in the video programming market-
place." 5 7 According to the Commission's most recent annual report, there
are now forty-five regional cable news networks.'58
The Commission also included the Internet as an informational source
for purposes of its Diversity Index, albeit a minor one, noting the "virtual
universe of information sources on the Internet."' 59 Here again, its position
did not survive judicial review because the court found it inconsistent with
the Commission's own statements-about counting only media outlets that
provide local news, and only those that perform an "aggregator" and a
"distillation" function. 6° This time, the Commission will need to provide a
better explanation if it wants to include the Internet in its analysis.' 6'
In doing so, it should ask whether its prior analysis of the Internet may
have been too narrow. Even as of two years ago, a Harris poll indicated
that 36% of those adults who go online do so to obtain local news. 62 But in
152 Id. at 28.
153 Id.
4 Id. at 27-28.
155 2002 Review, supra note 6, 414 n.924. The Third Circuit relied heavily on this same
data, but using a 30% figure. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 415 (3rd Cir.
2004), certs. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2902-04 (2005).
156 2002 Review, supra note 6, 1 413.
157 OPP Study, supra note 118, at 125-26.
158 Twelfth Video Competition Report, supra note 95, 1 185 tbl. C-3.
159 2002 Review, supra note 6, 1 427.
160 Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 406-07. See also Twelfth Video Competition Report, supra
note 95, 138.
161 Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 408. See also 2006 Pew Survey, supra note 127, at 15. In
light of the Third Circuit's criticism, the Commission may find relevant this recent survey
indicating that Internet "news aggregators such as Google News, Yahoo News, and AOL
News are now a major source of online news." Id.




any event, as the Supreme Court has recognized, Internet content is "as
diverse as human thought."' 163 In his Third Circuit dissent, Chief Judge
Scirica suggested that the Commission rethink "the emphasis on local
news," which ignores the value of the Internet as "an important source for
the dissemination of diverse information."'" The Commission itself has
recognized-even before the advent of the ubiquitous Internet-that "pro-
gramming that addresses local concerns need not be produced or originated
locally to qualify as 'issue-responsive' in connection with a [broadcast]
licensee's program service obligations.' 65
Whatever the problems associated with measuring use rather than avail-
ability, or with treating complementary products as substitutes, the Com-
mission obviously should update the record in light of the public's increas-
ing reliance on Internet content. The Commission's prior study indicated
that the Internet led all other outlets as the news source that survey respon-
dents would be more likely to use in the future. 66 Recent data also reveal
that the percentage of Americans who regularly get news online has now
increased from 23% to 31% between 2000 and 2006, with even stronger
growth among those aged twenty-five to sixty-four.167 Indeed, as of De-
cember 2005, another Pew survey reported that 50 million Americans turn
to the Internet for news on a typical day. 168 This sea change in access to
and use of the variety of news and information provided by the Internet
cannot be ignored in the 2006 Review.
E. The Top Four Restriction
In the 2002 Review, the Commission concluded that competition con-
cerns, principally in the DVP market, required some restraint on duopolies.
Accordingly, it continued to bar duopolies between any two top four-rated
stations in a market as "necessary to promote competition."' 169 As noted
above, that competition analysis is questionable and appears inconsistent
with Sinclair for ignoring other media as competitive outlets. There is also
reason to question whether such a top four restriction is (or remains) a jus-
tifiable response to such concerns even if they continued to be legitimate,
particularly in light of the sweeping effects of such a restriction. The re-
striction precludes a wide range of duopolies, including any relief in any of
163 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 852 n.7 (1997) (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp.
824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
164 Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 469 (Scirica, C.J., dissenting).
165 Broadcast Localism NOI, supra note 48, 14.
166 MOWG Study 8, supra note 132, at 72 (tbl.70), 73 (tbl.71), 74 (tbl.72), 75 (tbl.73), 76
(tbl.74).
167 2006 Pew Survey, supra note 127, at 2-3.
168 Pew Internet & American Life Project, Online News, Mar. 22, 2006,
http://207.21.232.103/pdfs/PIPNews.and.Broadband.pdf.
169 2002 Review, supra note 6, 220. See also id. 212.
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at least eighty markets with less than five commercial stations. 70 As still
unresolved petitions for reconsideration of the 2002 Review have pointed
out, the top four restriction was thus difficult to square with the Commis-
sion's repeated acknowledgements that it is in such smaller markets that
broadcasters have the most pressing need for duopoly relief, 71 and in
which Commissioner Adelstein recognized there is the greatest likelihood
of "proven localism gains" warranting such relief.
172
The Third Circuit upheld this "line-drawing" exercise as "not unreason-
able."'73 That holding certainly does not preclude the Commission from
reexamining the issue in light of current market conditions, as required by
section 202(h). Such a reexamination makes sense, because the 2002 Re-
view's analysis proceeded largely from a perspective of how profitable the
top four stations are in the largest markets. Given the recognized difficul-
ties of stations in the smaller markets, the 2006 Review should take greater
care to differentiate among markets of different sizes. In doing so, it should
focus on four issues raised in the 2002 Review.
First, as the Third Circuit recognized, the top four restriction was prem-
ised upon "welfare harms" in creating a new largest firm in the market.
174
A top four restriction appears to be an overbroad way of addressing that
concern. 75 As such, it prevents the leading station from acquiring a much
weaker-performing fourth-ranked station. It also prevents weaker third and
fourth-ranked stations from merging to compete with a dominant first-
ranked station. In fact, in the vast majority of markets below the top sev-
enty-five, combining the market shares of the third and fourth ranked sta-
tions would not displace the top ranked station.
76
170 See REED BUSINESS INFORMATION, BROADCASTING & CABLE YEARBOOK B 132-215
(2006). See also In re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's
Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, Petition for Reconsideration of LIN Television Corporation
and Raycom Media, Inc., at 8-9 att.A (Sept. 4, 2003) (accessible via FCC Electronic Com-
ment Filing System) [hereinafter LIN/Raycom Petition]. In 2002, the average number of
stations was no more than four in all 110 markets below the top 100. In re 2002 Biennial
Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other
Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Ex Parte
Communication of Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, chart 3 (Apr. 30, 2003).
171 See, e.g., LIN/Raycom Petition, supra note 170, at 3-13. The Commission recently
invited parties to update the record on pending petitions for reconsideration. 2006 Notice,
supra note 6, 36.
172 2002 Review, supra note 6, at 13,998.
173 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 417 (3rd Cir. 2004), certs. denied,
125 S. Ct. 2902-4 (2005).
174 Id. at 416.
'75 See id. at 416; 2002 Review, supra note 6, 195.
176 Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 417 n.49 (citing Ex Parte Filing of Nat'l Ass'n of Broad-




Second, the top four restriction assumed that such mergers would not be
capable of bringing local news programming to the market, because "top
four-ranked stations already provide local news programming."' 177 That was
not true in small markets then, and, given current financial trends, it is even
less likely to be true today. The data relied upon by the Commission in
2002 showed that 111 top four-ranked stations did not offer local news. 178
The vast majority of those stations were in smaller markets. 179 And the
record actually indicated that more than half of all markets (107 out of
210) had fewer than four independent local newscasts.
80
Third, the Commission's conclusion that top four-ranked stations are all
significantly more profitable than others was perplexing. It was based on
data supplied by National Association of Broadcasters ("NAB") that dem-
onstrated that this was true only by averaging all four network affiliates,
and only in the top 50 markets.1"' Such data ignored what NAB noted was
"a significant decline in financial performance" for top four affiliates "in
medium and small markets which were not ratings leaders in their mar-
kets."' 182 NAB's study demonstrated that the average low-rated affiliate of
one of the top four networks actually showed negative profitability in 2001
in markets 51-175, and that even the average high-rated affiliate of one of
these top four networks experienced flat or declining profitability in mar-
kets 51-100 and 126-150.183 Oddly, the Commission itself used this same
NAB data to conclude that ability "to compete successfully" is "meaning-
fully (and negatively) affected in mid-sized and smaller markets."'"
Fourth, the Commission saw a bright line distinction between the audi-
ence shares of the fourth and fifth-ranked networks, which it found to be
reflected generally in local market rankings of their affiliated stations. Na-
tional network data, however, is heavily skewed by the top twenty-five
177 2002 Review, supra note 6, 198. See also 1998 Review, supra note 6, 66.
178 2002 Review, supra note 6, 198 (finding 668 of 779 top four stations offered local
news). See also LIN/Raycom Petition, supra note 170, at 9-10.
179 See FoxINBC/Viacom Comments, supra note 86, at Economic Study A table Al.
180 Id. at 3-4. Although 18 of the smaller DMAs included in this figure had fewer than
four rated stations, in 13 of those 18 markets a rated station did not carry local news. Id. at
4. See also Ex parte filing of Gray Television, Inc. att. A (May 29, 2003) (120 out of 210
markets).
181 2002 Review, supra note 6, at 13,697 n.417 (citing Ex parte filing of NAB, April 30,
2003, at 2, Chart 1).
182 Ex parte Letter of Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, MB Docket No. 02-277, at 1 (April
30, 2003) (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System).
183 In re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, Comments of the Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, MB Docket No. 02-277,
MM Docket No. 01-235, MM Docket No. 01-317, MM Docket No. 00-244, at 74 and att.C
(Jan. 2, 2003). See also LIN/Raycom Petition, supra note 170, at 10-11.
184 2002 Review, supra note 6, 201.
20061
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
markets. 185 In addition, drawing this line between the fourth- and fifth-
ranked stations ignored the problems of the third- and fourth-ranked sta-
tions (particularly but not only in four-station markets). The record showed
that the fourth-ranked station, for example, trailed the third-ranked station
by 34% in audience share and 26% in revenue share. 186 Any such line-
drawing in the 2006 Review should examine the separation between sec-
ond-, third-, and fourth-ranked stations as well, using updated information.
Under the mandate of section 202(h), the top four restriction clearly war-
rants reexamination in the 2006 Review. To the extent any restriction on
small market duopolies continues to be warranted, one alternative that
ought to be to considered is an audience share cap, which was intended to
serve as a "backstop" when the Commission first allowed radio duopo-
lies 87 and was proposed as such an alternative by small market television
owners in the 2002 Review. 88 An important aspect of any such standard
would be whether-in light of the growing audience and advertising shares
of MVPDs-it should include nonbroadcast viewing. Another alternative
would be a tiered system reflective of the significant financial difficulties
faced by smaller market stations-e.g., a top four test in larger markets, a
top three test in middle markets, and a top two test in the smallest mar-
kets. 89 While the top four standard withstood judicial scrutiny as "not un-
reasonable" the last time around, the Commission is obligated to take a
harder look at that question in light of the foregoing concerns, and the cur-
rent state of broadcast television in smaller markets.
HI. CONCLUSION
In its approach to the 2006 Review of the television duopoly rule, this
Commission will undoubtedly look back with envy at its predecessors.
Justice Frankfurter vested the agency with sweeping "public interest" au-
thority in light of "the complicated factors for judgment in such a field,"
and intended that authority to serve as "a supple instrument for the exercise
of discretion by the expert body which Congress has charged to carry out
185 Id.
186 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 417 n.50 (2004), certs. denied, 125
S. Ct. 2902-04 (2005).
187 See 2002 Review, supra note 6, % 301. See also In re Revision of Radio Rules and
Policies, Report and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 2755, 40 (Mar. 12, 1992).
188 See Ex parte Letter of LIN Television Corp., Raycom Media, Inc., Waterman Broad-
casting Corp., and Montclair Comm., Inc., MB Docket No. 02-277 (May 15, 2003) (acces-
sible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing system) (endorsing 30% test).
189 Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 417 n.49 (citing Ex Parte Filing of Nat'l Ass'n of Broad-




its legislative policy."'" Fifty years ago, a very different D.C. Circuit also
authorized the Commission "to consider diversification of control.., and
to attach such significance to it as its judgment dictates.""19 As recent ap-
pellate decisions in this area make clear, these governing precepts are no
longer in vogue. The First Amendment standards applicable to corporate
speech are much more searching, the communications sector has become
much more important to the national economy and thus to Congress, and
the "well-known principles of deference accorded to agency decision-
making" '192 seem to be viewed with greater skepticism.
To surmount these obstacles after two failed attempts will be a challenge.
The one consistent theme from the courts has been the inconsistency of the
Commission's analysis, both internally and as compared to its prior deci-
sions. Some of these inconsistencies reflect policy differences among dif-
ferent Commissions, which are certainly acceptable if explained forth-
rightly and consistent with the 1996 Act.'9 3 Others seem to be a feature of a
decision-making process that tries to accomplish too much at one sitting,
requiring compromises that end up as vulnerabilities on judicial review.
Still other inconsistencies, like the ill-fated Diversity Index and the DVP
market analysis, seem based on understandable but ultimately problematic
efforts to quantify the unquantifiable nature of viewpoint diversity, or to
avoid addressing its "elusive" nature.
The prospect of a Commission confined to a cycle of never-ending sec-
tion 202(h) reviews and subsequent court challenges is a serious problem
for those smaller market television owners whose difficulties the Commis-
sion has long acknowledged, yet whose fate seems tied to the larger de-
bates about "Big Media." For them, a fourth try would not be a charm,'
94
because their competitive environment is changing too quickly. They need
the finality and reliability of a resolution that will hold up under judicial
scrutiny.
The Commission can maximize the chances for resolving this issue suc-
cessfully in its upcoming review by reference to a few key guideposts, in
addition to updating its prior record, an important statutory requirement in
light of the rapid pace of change in this industry. The Commission should
engage in a more rigorous analysis of the extent to which, in today's mul-
timedia environment, local television stations can realistically be viewed as
190 FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940). Accord Nat'l Broad. Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943); FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582,
593 (1981).
191 McClatchy Broad. Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
192 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 435 (3d Cir. 2004) (Scirica, C.J.,
dissenting in part, concurring in part), certs. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2902--04 (2005).
193 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59
(1983) (Rehnquist, J., Burger, C.J., Powell, J., & O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
194 Cf. Covad Commc'ns Co. v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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holding any market power over viewers or advertisers. It should avoid the
same form of "managed competition" in the marketplace of ideas that it
finally was forced to discard in the market for local competition in the tele-
communications sector, after almost a decade of litigation. 9 5 And the
Commission should commit to a much more granular analysis regarding
the effect of any proposed duopoly rule on television stations operating in
the difficult financial environment of smaller markets, without untested
assumptions about the value of network affiliations in those markets.
Finally, the Commission should demonstrate that it has taken a truly hard
look at the salient problems 96 that have served to animate so many of the
opponents of the 2002 Review. The Commission may well conclude that
there is "an alternative regulatory scheme or set of rules" apart from own-
ership limits to "better address" those problems, such as localism con-
cerns.' 97 It may also be able to ultimately reach closure on the issue of mi-
nority ownership, using constitutionally sustainable tools that do not de-
tract from any needed reforms of the duopoly rule.
198
The Commission may also conclude that the public interest standard may
warrant a wholly different approach to viewpoint diversity concerns. Some
have argued that there is "a large difference between the public interest and
what interests the public."' 99 There are obvious First Amendment perils in
prescribing medicine for an unwilling viewing public that now possesses
195 See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulation and Managed Competition
in Network Industries, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 117 (1998); Michael K. Powell, Comm'r, Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n, Technology and Regulatory Thinking: Albert Einstein's Warning,
Address Before the Legg Mason Investor Workshop (Mar. 13, 1998) (transcript available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Speechies/Powell/spmkp804.html). See generally JONATHAN E.
NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 92-108 (2005).
196 Fla. Cellular Mobil Commc'ns Corp. v. FCC, 28 F.3d 191, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 514 U.S. 1016 (1995) (quoting Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d
841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971)).
197 2006 Notice, supra note 6, 4.
198 The Third Circuit directed that the Commission's "rulemaking process" on remand
"address these proposals at the same time." Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d
372, 390-95 (3d Cir. 2004), certs. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2902-04 (2005). The 2006 Notice has
solicited further comment on them. While the court's instruction was not clear as to whether
or how regulatory reform should be tied to action on these proposals, that mandate should
be read in light of the Supreme Court's observation that agencies "should be free to fashion
their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to
discharge their multitudinous duties." FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143
(1940); accord. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 543-44 (1978).
See also 47 U.S.C. § 1540) (2000); GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 782 F.2d 263, 273-74 n.12
(D.C. Cir. 1986) ("inherent powers of an agency to control its own docket").
199 Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REv. 499, 501
(2000). But see In re Deregulation of Radio, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 87 F.C.C.2d
797, 19 (July 30, 1981) ("In our view, it is completely reasonable to conclude that indi-




the tools to avoid taking its prescription. As one commentator has urged,
however, if attention deficit disorder rather than viewpoint diversity is now
the problem we face in the Information Age, there may be more construc-
tive ways for the Commission to address it, or to suggest that Congress do
so, than by restricting ownership. E"0 As always, whether in regulating or in
deregulating, the Commission should consider any such alternatives seri-
ously advanced for its consideration, and provide defensible reasons if it
determines to reject them.2"' Getting this question right is vital if broadcast
television is to remain as a "survivor in a sea of competition.
20 2
200 Goodman, supra note 31, at 14, 57-60.
201 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46-
51 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., Burger, C.J., Powell, J., & O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
202 OPP Study, supra note 118, at 1.
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